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COMMENTS
FIDUCIARY AND ESTATE LIABILITY IN
CONTRACT AND IN TORT
For many individuals, designation as a trustee or personal rep-
resentative is a welcome occasion, for it is considered to be an
honor as well as a source of compensation. However, what many
fiduciaries' do not realize is the fact that they are subjecting them-
selves to possible personal liability for acts performed in the course
of the administration of the estate.
Similarly, many creditors dealing with a fiduciary who repre-
sents an estate might very well cease these dealings if they knew
that, upon a breach of contract on the fiduciary's part, they could
be limited in obtaining satisfaction to the personal assets of the
fiduciary alone.
This Comment will consider: (1) the extent to which trustees
and personal representatives, acting in the course of the adminis-
tration of the estate, may subject themselves to personal liability
in actions based on contracts or torts; (2) the extent to which the
estate may be held liable for the contracts and torts of its trustee
or personal representative acting in the course of the administra-
tion of the estate; (3) the interpretation which this author believes
should be given to sections 701.19(1), 701.19(11), 860.01 and
860.07 of the Wisconsin Statutes, in. light of the first two points;
and (4) the advisability of the use of various drafting techniques in
order to protect the fiduciary and to render the estate liable for
obligations properly incurred by the trustee or personal representa-
tive in the course of the administration of the estate.
I. PERSONAL LIABILITY OF FIDUCIARIES IN CONTRACT AND IN
TORT
As a general rule, both trustees and personal representatives
are personally liable for contracts entered into and breached in the
course of the administration of the estate2 unless, in the contract,
1. Throughout this article, the term "fiduciary" will be used generically for the terms
"trustee" and "personal representative."
2. Taylor v. Davis' Adm'x, 110 U.S. 330 (1884); Gates v. Avery, 112 Wis. 271, 87 N.W.
1091 (1901); McLaughlin, Adm'x v. Winner, 63 Wis. 120,23 N.W. 402 (1885); G. BOGERT,
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it is provided that the fiduciary shall not be personally liable.
Perhaps the leading case enunciating this rule is Taylor v. Davis'
Administratrix.i In this case, a former trustee of a land develop-
ment trust had a lien imposed in his favor upon the trust property
because of a debt owed him by the estate. He agreed to transfer
this lien to two successor trustees in consideration of their execu-
tion of a contract in which they promised to pay the trust's debt
to him out of the funds of the trust. The contract was signed by
the trustees "as trustees", with no specific stipulation negating
their personal liability. Five years after the promisee's death, and
with the contract still unperformed, the two successor trustees exe-
cuted an identical contract with the administrator of the estate of
the first trustee, thereby recognizing their original obligation.
Some time later the administrator brought an action in law against
the trustees for breach of contract. Upon a writ of error brought
to the United States Supreme Court challenging the propriety of
a personal judgment against the trustees, the Court held:
We are of opinion, therefore, that the plaiitiffs in error, hav-
ing assumed a personal liability, the suit was well brought against
them in a court of law, and that the court did not err in rendering
judgment against them in their individual capacity.5
Undoubtedly, the most often quoted passage in this case, justifying
the theory behind the rule holding a fiduciary personally liable for
contracts entered into in the course of the administration of the
estate, is the following:
A trustee is not an agent. An agent represents and acts for
his principal, who may be either a natural or artificial person. A
trustee may be defined generally as a person in whom some
estate, interest, or power in or affecting property is vested for the
benefit of another. When an agent contracts in the name of his
TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 712 (2d ed. 1960) [hereinafter cited as BOGERT]; RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 262 (1959) [hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT]; A. Scott, TRUSTS
§ 262 (3d ed. 1967) [hereinafter cited as SCOTT]; Johnston, Developments in Contract
Liability of Trusts and Trustees, 41 N.Y.U. L. REV. 483 (1966); Stone, A Theory of
Liability of Trust Estates for the Contracts and Torts of the Trustee, 22 COLUM. L. REV.
527 (1922) [hereinafter cited as Stone]; 34 C.J.S. Executors and Administrators § 715b
(1942); Annot., 139 A.L.R. 134 (1942); Annot., 138 A.L.R. 155 (1942).
3. RESTATEMENT § 263; ScoTT § 263; Annot., 139 A.L.R. 134 (1942); Annot., 138
A.L.R. 155 (1942).
4. 110 U.S. 330 (1884).
5. Id. at 337.
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principal, the principal contracts and is bound, but the agent is
not. When a trustee contracts as such, unless he is bound no one
is bound, for he has no principal. The trust estate cannot prom-
ise; the contract is therefore the personal undertaking of the
trustee. As a trustee holds the estate, although only with the
power and for the purpose of managing it, he is personally bound
by the contracts he makes as trustee, even when designating
himself as such. The mere use by the promisor of the name of
trustee or any other name of office or employment will not dis-
charge him. Of course, when a trustee acts in good faith and for
the benefit of the trust, he is entitled to indemnify himself for his
engagement out of the estate in his hands, and for this purpose
a credit for his expenditures will be allowed in his accounts by
the court having jurisdiction thereof
Another argument advanced to support the rule holding fidu-
ciaries personally liable for contracts entered into in the course of
the administration of the estate is that, in this fashion, the interests
of the beneficiaries will be sufficiently protected. If an action could
be brought in law against the fiduciary in his representative capac-
ity and if the judgment could be satisfied out of the estate property,
the beneficiaries might be held to be concluded as to the propriety
and the fairness of the contract without an opportunity to be heard.
It would definitely be to the fiduciary's advantage, if he entered
into an imprudent contract, to cover up and to be silent as to his
breach of trust. However, if the fiduciary is held personally liable,
the beneficiaries would not be bound as to the legality and the
prudence of the contract by any settlement or litigation between
the fiduciary and the third party. In this situation, the burden is
on the fiduciary, in the settlement of his accounts with the benefici-
aries, to prove that the contract which he entered into was prudent
and within the scope of his authority in order that he may justify
his claim of indemnity from the estate for monies.of his own which
he spent to satisfy his contract liability.7
6. Id. at 334-35. In regard to this point, Scott has stated:
The objection to stating that the trust estate is liable is that such a mode of expression
seems to personify the estate, and we have been told by Professor Hohfeld that legal
relations exist only between persons and not between a person and property.
ScoTT § 263, at 2230.
7. See BOGERT § 712, at 451-52. It would appear, however, that Bogert's objection to
direct action against the estate would have no solid foundation if the beneficiaries were
notified of the action and were permitted to intervene in order to object to the propriety of
the fiduciary's contract.
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Wisconsin has adopted the majority rule holding both trustees
and personal representatives personally liable for contracts entered
into in the course of the administration of the estate. In Gates v.
A very,' the Wisconsin Supreme Court considered the question as
to whether or not a beneficiary of a trust was liable on a contract
made by his trustee "as trustee." The court held:
The nonsuit was based upon a failure of the proof to connect
the defendant with the transaction set out in the complaint. The
contract and deed put in evidence show a transaction with
Parmly as trustee, but none of the beneficiaries are named in the
instruments. No contract relation between plaintiff and defen-
dant was shown. The subsequent declaration of trust executed by
Parmly did not change the contract he had made, or create a
contract between the parties to this suit. The trustee was not an
agent. When a trustee contracts as such, unless he is bound no
one is bound, for he has no principal. He holds the estate to
manage and control, and is personally bound by the contracts he
makes, even when designating himself as "trustee."'
Similarly, in McLaughlin v. Winner,0 an action brought by an
administratrix to recover the value of goods sold by the administra-
trix to the defendant and also an action in which the defendant
counterclaimed against the administratrix for the value of services
rendered by him at the administratrix's request, the court held that
a personal representative is personally liable on contracts made by
him in the course of the administration of the estate:
It is a general rule that upon all contracts made by an executor
or administrator, in the discharge of his duties as such, he is
liable personally, and his liability does not depend upon the fact
that he has assets in his hands sufficient to discharge the debts
8. 112 Wis. 271, 87 N.W. 1091 (1901).
9. Id. at 276-77, 87 N.W. at 1093. It can be argued that a fiduciary's signing of a
contract "as trustee" would not negate his personal liability in light of the Wisconsin
Supreme Court's holding in Wisconsin Trust Co. v. Chapman, 121 Wis. 479, 99 N.W. 341
(1904). In this case, pursuant to statutory authority, the probate court authorized the
defendant administrator to borrow money upon notes secured by the real estate of the
decedent and thereby to pay the debts of the decedent. The court held that the administrator
signed in a manner which negated his personal liability although he merely signed the note
as: "I, Oscar H. Pierce, administrator of the estate of Sherburn Bryant, deceased." Because
of its holding, the court felt that the administrator's prayer for reformation of the mortgage
in order to insert an express stipulation against personal liability, as he alleged was agreed
upon between him and the mortgagee, was not necessary.
10. 63 Wis. 120, 23 N.W. 402 (1885).
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so incurred; and the judgment, if any be recovered, is to be
satisfied out of his estate, and not out of the estate of the de-
ceased. There are, undoubtedly, exceptions to the general rule,
but they depend upon equitable considerations, which clearly
show that the estate in the hands of the executor or administrator
ought to be charged with the payment of the claim rather than
the property of the executor or administrator."
Besides being personally liable for contracts entered into the
course of the administration of the estate, it is well settled that a
fiduciary is also personally liable for torts committed by him in the
course of the administration of the estate. 2 This personal tort
liability of the fiduciary is primarily based upon the estate's not
being a legal entity, and also upon the principle that a fiduciary
may not impair the monetary interests of the beneficiaries of the
estate by his tortious acts:
The law will not allow trust property to be impaired or dissipated
through the negligence or improvidence of trustees . . . . The
beneficial interest thereof belongs to the cestuis, and it must be
held intact for them.' 3
In Johnston v. Long," the defendant executor appealed from a
judgment entered in favor of the plaintiff in the sum of $87,575 for
personal injuries sustained by the plaintiff when an overhead door
fell upon him as he was entering a garage which was part of the
estate of the decedent. The California court reiterated the general
rule that an executor is "liable for any torts committed by him in
the administration of the estate."' 5 The court went on to state:
If the plaintiff could recover directly from the estate in an action
against the executor in his representative capacity, the heirs
would have no assurance that the question of the personal fault
of the executor would be properly tried. It would not be to the
interest of either the plaintiff, who -would be attempting to re-
cover out of the assets of the estate, or the defendant, whose
interest as an individual and as an executor would be in conflict
11. Id. at 128-29, 23 N.W. at 406.
12. Johnston v. Long, 30 Cal. 2d 54, 181 P.2d 645 (1947); Massey v. Payne, 109 W.
Va. 529, 155 S.E. 658 (1930); RESTATEMENT § 264; ScoTT § 264; Stone 527; 34 C.J.S.
Executors and Administrators § 716a (1942); Annot., 127 A.L.R. 687 (1940); Annot., 44
A.L.R. 637 (1926).
13. Parmentar v. Barstow, 22 R.I. 245, 247, 47 A. 365, 366 (1900).
14. 30 Cal. 2d 54, 181 P.2d 645 (1947).
15. Id. at _., 181 P.2d at 648.
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. . .to show personal fault on the part of the executor. Under
the general rule that an executor is personally liable-for the torts
committed by him or his agents in the course of administration,
the plaintiff may recover a judgment against the executor person-
ally and the question of the executor's fault is determined in the
probate court, where the interest of the heirs may properly be
protected."6
Although the Wisconsin Supreme Court has apparently never
spoken for or against holding a trustee or a personal representative
personally liable for torts committed in administering the estate,
in Whitford v. Moehlenpah,17 the court recognized the possibility
of finding personal liability.
II. LIABILITY OF THE ESTATE
Looking at the fact of the fiduciary's personal liability upon a
breach of contract or for a tort strictly from the claimant's stand-
point, it must be recognized that the claimant can obtain complete
satisfaction only when the fiduciary is sufficiently solvent and sub-
ject to service. However, what of the situation in which the fidu-
ciary is insolvent or not subject to service? Is the claimant to be
without a satisfactory remedy merely because he cannot obtain
"personal" satisfaction from the fiduciary who acted in the course
of the administration of the estate?
The Restatement (Second) of Trusts lists five situations in
which a claimant has a right to reach the assets of the estate for
contractual and tort 8 obligations incurred by the fiduciary in his
administration. The theory behind these five situations is equally
applicable to personal representatives as well.
A. Reaching Trust Property Where Trustee is Entitled to
Exoneration
If a person to whom the trustee has become personally liable in
the course of the administration of the trust cannot obtain satis-
faction of his claim out of the trustee's individual property, he
can by a proceeding in equity reach trust property and apply it
16. Id. at _, 181 P.2d at 651 (citations omitted).
17. 196 Wis. 10, 23, 219 N.W. 361, 365 (1928).
18. One of these five situations, namely section 271, deals only with a contractual
obligation.
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to the satisfaction of his claim to the extent to which the trustee
is entitled to exoneration out of the trust estate. 19
Although the Restatement indicates that the rule found in this
section is primarily applicable where the fiduciary is found to be
insolvent or where he cannot be subjected to the jurisdiction of the
court,"0 not all jurisdictions have required the creditor to exhaust
his legal remedies against the fiduciary before he has been allowed
to bring his claim against the estate based upon the fiduciary's
right to exoneration.2 The fiduciary's right to exoneration, or in-
demnity as it is sometimes called, is not an absolute right, but one
dependent upon the fulfillment of two conditions. First, the obliga-
tion incurred by the'fiduciary, either in contract or in tort, must
be one incurred in the proper administration of the estate. Accord-
ingly, if the obligation is in tort, the fiduciary must be without
personal fault. Second, the fiduciary must not be in arrears in his
accounts to the estate. 22 On this last point, if, for example, the
fiduciary has committed a breach of trust making him personally
liable to restore to the estate an amount which equals or exceeds
the amount of the creditor's claim, the creditor cannot reach the
assets of the estate. Accordingly, if the amount which the fiduciary
is obligated to restore to the estate is less than the amount of the
liability properly incurred by him to the creditor, the creditor can
reach the assets of the estate only to the extent of the difference. 2
Obviously, the determination of the above two conditions di-
rectly affects the beneficiaries, since the question of their possible
economic loss, in having the creditor's claim paid out of their
shares in the estate, depends upon it. Thus, the beneficiaries should
have the right to intervene if they feel that the fiduciary is not
entitled to indemnity. It appears that intervention on the part of
the beneficiaries would be necessary if, in fact, the fiduciary were
not entitled to indemnity since it would always be to the fiduciary's
interest to attempt to establish that he properly incurred the obli-
19. RESTATEMENT § 268. See also cases cited in § 268 of the Appendix to the
RESTATEMENT.
20. RESTATEMENT § 268, comments b & c at 15.
21. Stone 540.
22. Restatement § 268, comments d & e at 15-16. See also Fulda & Pound, Tort
Liability of Trusts, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 1332, 1346 (1941). A fiduciary is not personally at
fault, for indemnity purposes, for a tort committed by an agent properly employed by the
fiduciary in the administration of the estate. ScoTt § 264, at 2164.
23. RESTATEMENT § 268, comment e at 16.
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gation in the course of the administration of the estate. The Uni-
form Trusts Act, adopted by only a small fraction of the jurisdic-
tions across the country,24 provides for direct action by contract
and tort creditors agaiist the fiduciary in his representative capac-
ity. However, it is required that the plaintiff notify each of the
beneficiaries of the existence and nature of the action in order that
they may effectively intervene. 21
B. Reaching Trust Property Where Trust Estate Benefitted
A person who has conferred a benefit on the trust estate and
cannot obtain satisfaction of his claim out of the trustee's indi-
vidual property can by a proceeding in equity reach trust prop-
erty and apply it to the satisfaction of his claim to the extent to
which the trust estate has been benefitted, unless under the cir-
cumstances it is inequitable to allow him such a remedyY
The remedy under this section can be independent of the rem-
edy found under section 268 supra, since there could occur numer-
ous situations in which the estate has received a benefit because of
a contract entered into by its fiduciary while, at the same time, the
fiduciary is not entitled to indemnity. 2 For example, as the first
illustration under this section of the Restatement indicates:
1. A devises Blackacre to B in trust. B misappropriates rents
amounting to $1,000.00. B is not empowered to borrow money
for the trust. B borrows $500.00 from C for the purpose of paying
taxes on Blackacre and the money lent is so applied. B is insol-
vent. C brings a suit in equity against B as trustee to recover
$500,00 from the trust property. C is entitled to recover.
Wisconsin, long ago, in Miller v. Tracy,29 recognized the rule
stated in this section of the Restatement. This action was brought
to recover monies in the sum of $552 owing .to the plaintiff for
services rendered and disbursements made in successfully defend-
24. As of 1966, five states (Nevada, New Mexico, North Carolina, Oklahoma, and
South Dakota) had adopted the Act.
25. UNIFORM TRUSTS ACT §§ 14-15.
26. Id.
27. RESTATEMENT § 269. See also cases cited in § 269 of the Appendix to the
RESTATEMENT.
28. As in the case of the indemnity remedy, § 268, not all jurisdictions require that the
creditor exhaust his remedies against the fiduciary before he is allowed to proceed against
the estate under the rule found in this section. See Stone 540.
29. 86 Wis. 330, 56 N.W. 886 (1893).
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ing a claim against the estate in the sum of $11,000. In deciding
upon this claim brought against the estate of the decedent, the
court stated:
In McLaughlin v. Winner, 63 Wis. 128, it was held that "it is
the general rule that upon all contracts made by an executor or
administrator in the discharge of his duties as such he is liable
personally, and his liability does not depend upon the fact that
he has assets in his hands sufficient to discharge the debts so
incurred; and the judgment recovered i§ to be satisfied out of his
estate, and not out of the estate of the deceased," That is to say,
that the creditor in such case cannot, save in exceptional circum-
stances, have his claim allowed directly to him against and paid
out of the estate. But where the estate has derived a benefit from
the services rendered to the administrator, and he is unable to
pay or is insolvent, the creditor has been allowed to prove and
proceed directly against the estate. 30
The New York intermediate appellate court, in Scheibeler v.
Albee,31 also recognized reaching the assets of the estate under
what may be called this "unjust enrichment" theory. In that case,
the defendants, trustees and executors of an estate, contracted to
sell property to the plaintiff's assignor and to give good title ther-
eto. The assignor deposited $1,000. Upon the defendants' inability
to give good title, the plaintiff, without showing the insolvency of
the personal representatives, sued them in their representative ca-
pacity for the $1,000 down payment and also for $500 in damages.
Upon the defendants' challenge to the suit brought against them
in their representative capacity, the court held:
The $1,000.00 was lawfully received by the defendants in their
representative capacity in dealing concerning the property of the
testator. . . . The defendants having received the money in their
representative capacity, an action can be maintained against
them in that same capacity for its recovery.32
30. Id. at 333-34, 56 N.W. at 867-68. Reference should also be made to estate of
Sheldon, 249 Wis. 430, 24 N.W.2d 875 (1946). In that case, the decedent died leaving his
brother and a niece as his only heirs at law. The brother was appointed administrator. He
then filed a claim against the estate to which the niece objected. She employed counsel to
contest the claim with the result being that the court allowed the administrator only $390.95
of his claim for $1,120.00. The niece then filed a claim against the estate for the attorney
fees. The administrator objected. The court allowed the claim against the estate based on
the unjust enrichment theory.
31. 114 App. Div. 146, 99 N.Y.S. 706 (1906).
32. Id. at 147, 99 N.Y.S. at 707.
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An important point to note in the court's decision is that the court
would not allow the recovery of the $500 in damages from the
estate since this was held to be an individual liability of the fidu-
ciaries and not an unjust enrichment of the estate.
C. Where the Terms of the Trust Provide for Liability of the
Estate
Persons to whom the trustee has incurred a liability in the admin-
istration of the trust can by a proceeding in equity reach trust
property and apply it to the satisfaction of their claims, if by the
terms of the trust the settlor manifested an intention to confer
such a power upon them. 33
The remedy under this section is available although the fidu-
ciary is not entitled to indemnity and, thus, the creditor is pre-
cluded from proceeding under the rule stated in section 268. Simi-
larly, the remedy under this section is available although no benefit
has been conferred on the estate and, thus, the creditor is precluded
from reaching the assets of the estate under the rule stated in
section 269.
Comment b to this section of the Restatement indicates that the
fiduciary exoneration clause, found in many trust documents and
wills, is applicable under this section in order to render the estate
liable for the contracts and torts of its fiduciary.34 The mere exist-
ence of this clause, however, according to some case law, is not
enough to establish the liability of the estate in actions founded
upon a contract. These cases have held that a promisee must have
had actual or constructive notice of trust provisions negating the
personal liablity of the fiduciary for contracts entered into in the
course of the administration of the estate before he will be able to
proceed directly against the assets of the estate.35 The basic theory
33. RESTATEMENT § 270. See also cases cited in § 270 of the Appendix to the
RESTATEMENT.
34. On the other hand, a provision in the trust instrument that the trustee
shall not be personally liable for expenses incurred in the administration of the trust
is ordinarily interpreted as manifesting an intention to confer upon creditors a power
to reach the trust estate.
RESTATEMENT § 270, comment b at 21.
35. James Stewart & Co. v. National Shawmut Bank, 75 F.2d 148 (1st Cir. 1935); East
River Say. Bank v. 245 Broadway Corp., 284 N.Y. 470, 31 N.E.2d 906 (1940); Pennsylvania
Co. for Ins. on Lives & Granting Annuities v. Wallace, 346 Pa. 532, 31 A.2d 71 (1943).
Scott says:
Such a provision in the trust instrument, however, does not of itself preclude the
[Vol. 55
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behind such holdings is that the parties must intend that the estate,
and not the fiduciary, is to be liable on the contract36 before the
courts will give effect to this provision.
It is further indicated in comment b that if a trust is created in
order to carry on the business of the settlor, an intention of the
settlor can be inferred to subject the assets of the estate employed
in the business to the payment of liabilities incurred by the fidu-
ciary in carrying on the businesY.37 In fact, the settlor may indicate
his intention to subject the entire estate property, and not merely
the property. employed in the business, to the payment of such
liabilities 8.3  Ernest G. Beaudry, Inc. v. Freeman39 was a case
which applied this "business trust" theory to a situation concerning
a personal representative. This case dealt with a personal injury
suffered by the plaintiff when he was struck by a metal sign blown
off the premises rented by the decedent. The executor was in pos-
session of the premises and conducting the business of the decedent
when the sign struck the plaintiff. The court held in this suit
brought against the representative in his representative capacity:
[I]t is the general rule that a representative of the estate is not
liable in his representative capacity for a tortious act committed
by him unless the estate W~hich he represents receives a pecuniary
benefit therefrom. This general rule applies only where dne is
acting in his representative capacity in the administration and
distribution of estates under the general law and where no duty
or right of control over the'property is vested in him beyond his
mere representative power. . . . Under the doctrine announced
in the decision cited under this division, there is no doubt in our
minds but that under the testamentary scheme the First National
Bank as executor and trustee of Ernest G. Beaudry was liable to
the plaintiff for the injuries inflicted by its tortious act in its
representative and not individual capacity. And the plaintiff had
a right of action against the estate for which the executor and
trustee was liable in his representative capacity."
trustee from being personally liable. . . . But where the other party to the contract
has notice of the provision, it may be considered with other facts in determining
whether it was the understanding of the parties to the contract that the trustee should
not be personally liable.
ScoTr § 263.2, at 2235.
36. See Annot., 138 A.L.R. 155, 160 (1942).
37. RESTATEMENT § 270, comment b at 21.
38. Id.
39. 73 Ga. 736, 38 S.E.2d 40 (1946).
40. Id. at - 38 S.E.2d at 46.
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D. Where Contract Binds the Trust Estate
If the trustee makes a contract with a third person and the con-
tract provides that the trustee shall not be personally liable on
the contract but that th6' third person shall look only to the trust
estate, the third person can by a proceeding in equity reach trust
property and apply it to the satisfaction of his claim upon the
contract, provided that the contract was properly made by the
trustee in the administration of the trust.41
Under the rule stated in this section, as was also noted under
the rule found in section 268 supra' situations might exist in which
the fiduciary did not enter into the contract in the proper adminis-
tration of the estate and, thus, the beneficiaries might have to
intervene in the suit brought against the representative in his repre-
sentative capacityain order to prove this point.
Some courts have taken the position that the effect of a con-
tract providing for the estate's liability merely exempts the fidu-
ciary's individual property from liability. Under this theory, the
creditor can reach the assets of the estate only to the extent that
the fiduciary is entitled to indemnity from the estate. 42 The
Restatement, however, has taken the position that such a contract
gives to the creditor a direct claim against the assets of the estate,
available even though the fiduciary is in arrears in his accounts
and, thus, the creditor is precluded from proceeding against the
estate under the rule stated in section 268.13 Some criticism has
been directed at the logic of both of the above two theories. As to
the indemnity theory, it has been argued that a fiduciary's right to
indemnity comes into existence only at the time he expends his own
funds for the benefit of the estate. Accordingly, where he has not
made such an expenditure, it has been maintained that the promi-
see has no derivative claim at all.44 As to the direct action theory,
which does not permit setoffs if the fiduciary is in arrears in his
accounts, it has been questioned why, as a matter of policy, the
fiduciary should be permitted simultaneously to relieve his individ-
ual liability and to impose on the estate a greater liability than
41. RESTATEMENT § 271. See also cases~cited in § 271 of the Appendix to the
RESTATEMENT.
42. See ScoTT § 271, at 2284.
43. RESTATEMENT § 271, comment c at 22-23.
44. Johnston, Developments in Contract Liability of Trusts and Trustees, 41 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 483, 498 (1966).
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would be present under the indemnity theory if the policy behind
the personal liability rule for fiduciaries is to protect the beneficiar-
ies .45  0
E. Other Situations Where It Is Equitable to Permit Satisfaction
Out of the Trust Estate
A person to whom the trustee has incurred a liability in the
course of the administration of the trust may be permitted to
obtain satisfaction of his claim out of the trust estate if it is
equitable to permit him to do so, although his claim does not fall
within the rules stated in Sections 268-271.11
Although the Restatement does not cite any cases to support
section 271A, which it ,calls the "modern trend" regarding the
question of reaching the assets of the estate, it can be argued that
the Wisconsin Supreme Court, although sometimes speaking in
broad language, has recognized the soundness of the rule found in
this section. As was previously mentioned, in McLaughlin v.
Winner,47 the court indicated that although the fiduciary is gener-
ally personally liable for contracts entered into "in the discharge
of his duties,""
[t]here are, undoubtedly, exceptions to the general rule, but they
depend upon equitableconsiderations which clearly show that the
estate in the hands of the executor or administrator ought to be
charged with the payment of the claim rather than the property
of the executor or administrator.49
In Estate of Arneberg,51 it was recognized that the "insolvency or
financial inability" of the fiduciary to satisfy the contract creditor
is an equitable consideration which justifies the creditor's reaching
the assets of the estate.5 In other words, the court indicated that
when "it is necessary" for the creditor's protection, his claim will
be satisfied from the assets of the estate.52 In Juergens v. Ritter,53
45. Id.
46. RESTATEMENT § 271A.
47. 63 Wis. 120, 23 N.W. 402 (1885).
48. Id. at 128, 23 N.W. at 406.
49. Id. at 129, 23 N.W. at 406.
50. 184 Wis. 570, 200 N.W. 557 (1924).
51. Id. at 574, 200 N.W. at 558.
52. Id.
53. 227 Wis. 480, 279 N.W. 51 (1938).
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however, the court recognized that there may very well be other
"equitable considerations or exceptional circumstances" besides
the insolvency of the fiduciary which would justify the ceditor's
reaching the assets of the estate:
Under our law an attorney for an executor or administrator may
not file a claim for his fee against an estate in the absence of
showing that the executor is insolvent or unless there exist some
equitable considerations or exceptional circumstances. 4
On the basis of the above cases, it can be argued that Wisconsin
has taken the enlightened position that whenever a fiduciary, in the
proper administration of the estate, has individually incurred an
obligation in contract, and the fiduciary is himself unable to pay
this obligation, or when, in fact, other equitable considerations or
exceptional circumstances exist, the assets of the estate should be
made available to the creditor. This is so regardless of the amount,
if any, of indemnity to which the fiduciary is entitled, the extent,
if any, to which the estate has been benefitted, and the existence
of a settlor's or testator's intent to make the assets of the estate
liable for the obligations incurred by its fiduciaries. This Wisconsin
position is consistent with the "economic risk theory" which holds
that an economic entity, such as an estate, should bear the expenses
incident to its existence:
This theory of liability of the trust estate for its expenses
through the exercise of the trustee's power to appropriate trust
property for that purpose thus affords a harmonious and consis-
tent scheme for imposing on the trust estate those economic
burdens which are incidental to its proper administration."
It is submitted that this suggested position should not be lim-
ited to situations in which the fiduciary contracts in the proper
administration of the estate but, rather, this position should also
be extended to the tort obligations incurred by the fiduciary in the
course of the proper administration of the estate, at least where the
.fiduciary is not himself guilty of an intentional or grossly negligent
tort. Support for this proposition can be obtained from the fact
that both the economic risk theory56 and the Restatement, in the
situations discussed in which the creditor could reach the assets of
54. Id. at 488, 279 N.W. at 55.
55. Stone 539.
56. Id. at 542-43.
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the estate, generally treat alike those contractual and tort obliga-
tions incurred by the fiduciary in the proper administration of the
estate.
As a final point, it should be noted that the suggested rule under
the last cited Wisconsin cases, apparently dealing with obligations
incurred by the fiduciary in the proper administration of the estate,
is arguably not the rule to be followed when the fiduciary incurs
an obligation not in the proper administration of the estate. It
would appear that a creditor proceeding under either the unjust
enrichment theory (section 269) or under a broad fiduciary exoner-
ation clause (section 270) would be able, in Wisconsin, to make a
strong argument for recovery from the estate even though the
obligation was not incurred by the fiduciary in the proper adminis-
tration of the estate.
III. THE NEW WISCONSIN STATUTES
Sections 701.19(1) and 701.19(1 1), dealing with trustees, be-
came effective July 1, 1971, while sections 860.01 and 860.07, deal-
ing with personal representatives, became effective April 1, 1971.1
57. Wis. STAT. § 701.19 (1969):
Powers of Trustees. (1) Power to Sell, Mortgage or Lease. In the absence of contrary
or limiting provisions in the creating instrument, in the court order appointing a
trustee or in a subsequent order, a trustee has complete power to sell, mortgage or
lease trust property without notice, hearing or order. A trustee has no power to give
warranties in a sale, mortgage or lease which are binding on himself personally. In
this section "sale" includes an option or agreement to transfer for cash or on credit,
exchange, partition or settlement of a title dispute; this definition is intended to
broaden rather than limit the meaning of "sale." "Mortgage" means any agreement
or arrangement in which trust property is used as security.
( I) Protection of Third Parties. With respect to a third person dealing with a
trustee or assisting a trustee in the conduct of a transaction, the existence of trust
power and its proper exercise by the trustee may be assumed without inquiry. The
third person is not bound to inquire whether the trustee has power to act or is
properly exercising the power; and a third person, without actual knowledge that the
trustee is exceeding his powers or improperly exercising them, is fully protected in
dealing with the trustee as if the trustee possessed and properly exercised the powers
he purports to exercise. A third person is not bound to assure the proper application
of trust property paid or delivered to the trustee.
WIS STAT. § 860.01 (1969):
Power of personal representative to sell, mortgage and lease. A personal representa-
tive to whom letters have been issued by the probate court and whose letters have
not been revoked has complete power to sell, mortgage or lease any property in the
estate without notice, hearing or court order. The'rights and title of any purchaser,
mortgagee or lessee from the personal representative are in no way affected by any
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At this time, attention is directed, in chief, to the changes which
these statutes have made in regard to the Wisconsin position as to
the fiduciary's and the estate's liability for contracts entered into
by the fiduciary in behalf of the estate.
Although sections 701.19(1) and 860.01 give to a trustee and a
personal representative the authority to sell, mortgage, and lease
the property of the estate, the granting of this power does not, in
and of itself, change the Wisconsin rule holding a fiduciary person-
ally liable for contracts entered into in behalf of the estate. The
validity of this conclusion can be seen if one merely recognizes the
fact that the fiduciary personal liability rule has generally been
applied to situations in which a fiduciary was authorized to enter
into the contract which resulted in his personal liability. 5s The
Wisconsin legislature has, however, seen fit to dictate in sections
701.19(1) and 860.07 respectively, that neither trustees nor per-
sonal representatives have the power to give warranties in the sell-
ing, mortgaging, or leasing of the property of the estate which are
binding upon themselves personally. An encyclopedic definition of
"warranty" has been adopted by the Wisconsin Supreme Court:
"A warranty is an assurance by one party to a contract of the
existence of a fact upon which the other party may rely. It is
intended to relieve the promisee of any duty to ascertain the fact
for himself, and amounts to a promise to indemnify the promisee
for any loss if the fact warranted proves untrue .... " 17A
C.J.S., Contracts, p. 325, sec. 342.51
Although this Comment is not intended to discuss the vast number
of possible warranties and the nature of the same which could be
applicable in the selling, mortgaging, or leasing of the property of
an estate,"0 it should be noted that the common law principles of
provision in a will of the decedent or any procedural irregularity or jurisdictional
defect in the administration of the decedent's estate. A transfer agent or a corpora-
tion transferring its own securities incurs no liability to any person by making a
transfer of securities in an estate as requested or directed by the personal representa-
tive.
WIs. STAT. § 860.07 (1969):
No warranties. Except as under s. 860.09(2), a personal representative has no power
to give warranties in any sale, mortgage or lease of property which are binding on
himself personally or on the estate of the decedent.
58. See part I of this Comment supra.
59. Dittman v. Nagel, 43 Wis. 2d 155, 160, 168 N.W.2d 190, 193 (1969).
60. For a rather thorough enumeration of the numerous types of warranties which could
exist in a contract to sell, mortgage, or lease property, see 44A WORDS AND PHRASES
Warrant 583 (1962).
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warranty, and these only, apply when real property is involved.
There are special warranty provisions which are included in the
Uniform Sales Act and the Uniform Commercial Code which are
specifically applicable only to the sale of "goods," with realty not
being included in the definition of goods." Therefore, sections
701.19{1) and, 860.07, in regard to warranties executed by a fidu-
ciary in the selling, mortgaging, and leasing of the property of the
estate, have negated the Wisconsin rule holding fiduciaries person-
ally liable for contracts entered into in behalf of the estate. 2 There
will be, however, many "non-warranty" situations in the selling,
mortgaging, and leasing of the property of the estate in which the
Wisconsin personal liability rule will still stand. For example, a
fiduciary with the power to mortgage will normally be personally
liable on the covenant to pay in the mortgage in the absence of
language in the mortgage relieving him from personal liability. 3
Also, a fiduciary can be held personally liable both to a real estate
broker64 and to a purchaser65 where he contracts to sell the property
of the estate and he subsequently defaults on the obligation to
convey.
Attention is now directed to the question of when the estate
may be held liable for a breached contract to sell, mortgage, or
lease the property of the estate.
As in the case of the fiduciary's personal liability, the mere
granting to the fiduciary of the authority to sell, mortgage, and
lease the property of the estate does not per se change the Wiscon-
sin rule concerning the situations in which a creditor may reach the
assets of the estate for a contractual obligation incurred by its
fiduciary. This conclusion is supported by the fact that the credi-
tor's reaching of the assets of the estate has normally been applied
to situations in which the fiduciary was authorized to enter into the
contract which resulted in the obligation for which the estate was
held liable.6 Accordingly, it was previously stated that it can be
argued that Wisconsin has taken the position that whenever a
61. Dittman v. Nagel, 43 Wis. 2d 155, 161, 168 N.W.2d 190, 193 (1969).
62. A breach of warranty being an action in contract, see Oelwein Chemical Co. v.
Baker, 204 Iowa 66, 214 N.W. 595 (1927).
63. 90 C.J.S. Trusts § 318 (1955). The fiduciary, however, would apparently not be
personally liable if he were protected by a fiduciary exoneration clause.
64. Rosenthal v. Schwartz, 214 Mass. 371, 101 N.E. 1070 (1913).
65. Piff v. Berresheim, 405 Ill. 617, 92 N.E.2d 113 (1950).
66. See part II of this Comment supra.
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fiduciary, in the proper administration of the estate has individu-
ally incurred an obligation in contract and is himself unable to pay
this obligation, or when other equitable considerations or excep-
tional circumstances exist, the assets of the estate should be made
available to the creditor. Although reaching the estate's assets in
the above situations seems conditional upon the fiduciary's incur-
ring the obligation in the proper administration of the estate, sec-
tion 701.19(11) indicates that
a third person, without actual knowledge that the trustee is ex-
ceeding his powers or improperly exercising them, is fully pro-
tected in dealing with the trustee as if the trustee possessed and
properly exercised the powers he purports to exercise.
Therefore, it appears as though the above-suggested Wisconsin
position, as to reaching the assets of the estate, could be argued to
be applicable even when the trustee does not act in the proper
administration of the estate in the selling, mortgaging, or leasing
of the property of the estate if the third party does not have actual
knowledge of the trustee's improper administration. It would ap-
pear, however, that even where a third party had actual knowledge
that a trustee was exceeding his powers in the sale, mortgage, or
lease of the estate's property, an argument could be made to reach
the assets of the estate in a situation in which there was a broad
fiduciary exoneration clause 7 covering both obligations incurred
by a fiduciary in the proper and in the improper administration of
the estate. Similar to section 701.19(1) is section 860.01:
The rights and title of any purchaser, mortgagee or lessee from
the personal representative are in no way affected by any provi-
sion in a will of the decedent or any procedural irregularity or
jurisdictional defect in the administration of the decedent's es-
tate.
It should be noted, however, that under section 860.01, no excep-
tion is made for a third party with actual knowledge of the personal
representative's impropriety. A final point which should be men-
tioned is that section 860.07, as opposed to section 701.19(1), states
that a personal representative has no power to give warranties in
a sale, mortgage, or lease of the property of the deceased which
are binding upon the estate. Accordingly, it appears as though this
section could be construed so as to deny a creditor's7 plea to recover
67. RESTATEMENT § 270, comment c at 21.
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from the assets of the estate for the breach of a warranty executed
by a personal representative." It does not, however, necessarily
follow that a creditor should be denied recovery from the assets of
the estate for a breach of a warranty, in a contract executed by a
personal representative to sell, mortgage, or lease the property of
the estate, if the estate has received a benefit which constitutes an
unjust enrichment.
Therefore, the new Wisconsin statutes have made only a lim-
ited change in the Wisconsin rule as to the fiduciary's and the
estate's liability for contracts entered into in behalf of the estate.
It does appear, however, that these statutes do indicate that when
a trustee, acting within the scope of his authority (and even outside
of his authority if the third party does not have actual knowledge
of this fact), or a personal representative contracts to sell, mort-
gage, or lease the property of the estate, the estate becomes bound
on these contracts." Again, an exception to the above statement
will lie in the case of warranties executed by a personal representa-
tive in the selling, mortgaging, or leasing of the property of the
estates.
It might seem somewhat contradictory to state, in one instance,
that the fiduciary is generally personally liable on contracts to sell,
mortgage, or lease the property of the estate and the estate is only
liable in certain special situations, and, in another instance, that
the effect of these contracts, with one exception, is to bind the
estate. This apparent difficulty might best be resolved by consider-
ing the informative case of Packard v. Kingman.70 This was an
action for a construction of a will in which the executors were given
"full power and authority to grant, alien, bargain, sell, convey,
mortgage, lease and assign"' all of the decedent's estate. In the
complaint for the construction of the will, the executors stated that
68. The comment to § 860.07, as found in Wis. Laws 1969, ch. 339, states: "This section
is new and its purpose is to prevent the encumbrance of other assets in an estate by
warranting title to real estate sold."
69. See Gilbert v. Penfield, 124 Cal. 244, 56 P. 1107 (1899); Roberts v. Hale, 124 Iowa
296, 99 N.W.. 1075 (1904); Warren v. Pazolt, 203 Mass. 328, 89 N.E. 381 (1909); Packard
v. Kingman, 109 Mich. 497, 67 N.W. 551 (1896); Columbus Land, Loan & Bldg. Ass'n v.
Wolken, 146 Neb. 684, 21 N.W.2d 418 (1946); Tarenzi v. Maxwell, 21 Misc. 2d 185, 190
N.Y.S.2d 727 (Sup. Ct. 1959); Meyer v. Johnson, 51 Wash. 2d 175, 316 P.2d 1090 (1957);
Wisconsin Trust Co. v. Chapman, 121 Wis. 479, 99 N.W. 341 (1904).
70. 109 Mich. 497, 67 N.W. 551 (1896).
71. Id. at -, 67 N.W. at 552.
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they feared
it might be held that, under the language of the will, they would
not have the authority and the power to bind said estate, and that
the result of such acts upon their part would be to only bind and
charge themselves, personally and individually, for matters in
which they would have no personal interest whatever."
The court held that the provisions of the will gave the executors
the power to bind the estate on contracts to sell, mortgage, and
lease. In recognizing the possibility of a breach of contract, how-
ever, the court indicated that it was not, by holding that the execu-
tors had the power to bind the estate, doing away with the common
law rule as to their personal liablity for contracts entered into in
the course of the administration of the estate:
While we hold that it is within the power of the executors to
perform the acts mentioned, and, therefore, that the estate would
be bound thereby, we do not overlook the rule that the effect of
such contracts is usually to bind the trustee personally, and that
the other contracting party must pursue his remedy against the
trustee. This doctrine is established by a list of cases, long and
generally uniform .7
The court went on to indicate that the estate could be held liable
if it were benefitted by the contract of if the fiduciary expressly
contracted for the estate's liability. 74 Therefore, when in compli-
ance with sections 701.19(1), 701.19(11), and 860.01, a trustee or
a personal representative contracts to sell, mortgage, or lease the
property of the estate, the fiduciary has the power and the duty to
apply only the estate's property necessary to satisfy the terms of
the contract. Accordingly, an action for specific performance will
lie when he fails in the performance of this duty.75 If, however,
there is a breach of the contract, excluding a breach of warranty,
the third party must obtain satisfaction from the fiduciary person-
ally, assuming he signed in an individual capacity, unless the pre-
viously discussed theories for recovery from the assets of the estate,
as a whole, are applicable. A clear illustration of this point can be
seen from the fact that certain courts, including Wisconsin's, have
72. Id. at , 67 N.W. at 554.
73. Id. at 67 N.W. at 555.
74. Id.
75. Tarenzi v. Maxwell, 21 Misc. 2d 185, 190 N.Y.S.2d 727 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
[Vol. 55
COMMENTS
interpreted the effect of a statute empowering a personal represent-
ative to mortgage the real property of the estate so as to hold that
only the real property actually mortgaged is bound thereby and
that a deficiency judgment will not lie against other assets of the
estate but rather against the fiduciary personally if he signed the
note in an individual capacity.76
IV. DRAFTING TECHNIQUES
The last aspect to be discussed in this paper is the advisability
of the use of various drafting techniques, both to facilitate a credi-
tor's reaching the assets of the estate and to protect the fiduciary
from a personal judgment in contract or in tort which forces him
to seek indemnity from a sometimes unwilling estate, or, perhaps
worse than this, from an insolvent estate.
First of all, a point which cannot be overemphasized is that an
attorney representing a fiduciary should see to it that all contracts
executed by the fiduciary, in the administration of the estate, con-
tain a provision to the effect that the fiduciary is not to be person-
ally liable for a possible breach of contract but that the other party
is to look solely to the estate for liability. Admittedly, such a
provision would not be necessary in the case of a breach of a
warranty in a contract to sell, mortgage, or lease, but the possibili-
ties of a different type of breach of contract are numerous. Al-
though specific authorization in the trust document or the will for
the insertion of such a provision would be helpful, it does not
appear that this is essential in order to permit the fiduciary to
specifically negate his personal liability and to cause any possible
liability to fall on the estate.77 From a settlor's or a testator's point
of view, it would likely not be harmful for him to authorize such
an insertion, since it seems highly unlikely that a third party would
deal to any great extent with a fiduciary if he felt that his only
source of satisfaction for a possible breach of contract might be
the assets of the fiduciary.
Second, it would appear advisable for an attorney representing
a would-be fiduciary to attempt to have inserted in the trust docu-
ment or will a provision to the effect that liabilities incurred by the
76. Columbus Land, Loan & Bldg. Ass'n v. Wolken, 146 Neb. 684, 21 N.W.2d 418
(1946); Meyer v. Johnson,51 Wash. 2d 175, 316 P.2d 1090 (1957); Wisconsin Trust Co. v.
Chapman, 121 Wis. 479, 99 N.W. 341 (1904).
77. ScoTT § 271, at 2285.
1972]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
fiduciary in the course of the administration of the estate shall not
become personal liabilities of the fiduciary. Such a provision would
manifest an intention on the part of the settlor or testator to confer
upon creditors the power to reach the assets of the estate and not
the assets of the fiduciary. Accordingly, because of the manifesta-
tion of.this intention, under the rule set forth in section 270 of the
Restatement, as supplemented by the cases set forth in note 35, the
creditors would be able to reach the assets of the estate and not
those of the fiduciary. An exoneration clause of this type not only
protects the fiduciary from the claims of third parties, but it can
also protect him from the beneficiaries as well. It should be ob-
served, however, that such an exoneration clause (perhaps better
known as an exculpatory clause when dealing with beneficiaries)
only protects a fiduciary from the beneficiaries when he acts in
good faith, and that there is no attempt to excuse him from any
acts of willful misconduct.78 Assume, for example, that the fidu-
ciary, in good faith, but in an imprudent manner, sells, leases, or
mortgages the decedent's estate under the authority given to him
either in section 701.19(1) or section 860.01. Because he has acted
in good faith, although imprudently, the exoneration (exculpatory)
clause would, presumably, prevent liability from attaching against
him based upon a cause of action by a beneficiary. 79 Again, it can
be mentioned that sections 701.19(1) and 860.07 have created what
can be referred to as a statutory exoneration clause in the case of
warranties executed by a fiduciary in a contract to sell, mortgage,
or lease the property of the estate.
Third, it would be beneficial both from the estate's point of
view and from that of the fiduciary to have inserted in the trust
document or will a provision giving the fiduciary the authority to
take out both fire and general liability insurance. However, it does
not appear to be conditional, as to the fiduciary's power to take
out such insurance, that explicit authorization is essential, since the
argument can be made that it is his duty to take out such insur-
78. Annot., 83 A.L.R. 616, 617 (1933).
79. Without the presence of such an exoneration (exculpatory) clause, the fiduciary in,
for example, the selling of the real property of the estate
must act not only honestly or with good faith in the narrow sense but must also
exercise the duty of loyalty toward the beneficiary for whose benefit the power of
sale is to be exercised and with such care and skill as a man of ordinary prudence
would exercise in dealing with his own property.
In re Estate of Scheibe, 30 Wis. 2d 116, 119, 140 N.W.2d 196, 198 (1966).
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ance. 0 It seems as though taking out fire and general liability
insurance should'not be confined to the situation in which the
fiduciary is actually conducting a business. Tragedies can occur
just as readily on an estate which consists of only a home and a
small amount of cash.
V. CONCLUSION
It is .admitted that a fiduciary, if found to be personally liable
in contract or in tort, generally will be able tQ secure indemnity
from his estate for monies of his own used to satisfy these liabili-
ties. Accordingly, a creditor will normally be able to obtain satis-
faction either from the fiduciary or from the estate. There is, how-
ever, a strong argument favoring prudent drafting techniques in
order to avoid .this circuity of action and, thereby, to render the
estate directly liable for the normal obligations incident to its exis-
tence.
MICHAEL F. DUBIS
80. See RESTATEMENT §§ 176, comment b at 381, and 247, comment e at 625; ScoTT
§ 264, at 2243.
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